The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan as a Geostrategic Manoeuvre

Did the US really fail to serve its geostrategic interests by withdrawing from Afghanistan? It is unlikely that this planned withdrawal connotes real defeat. The US now has precipitated a security situation in the Middle East where it can rely on the emergence of one or more of several local outcomes that will benefit its geostrategic aims.

While it is true that China has to some extent outmanoeuvred and outspent the US by buying the allegiance of both Iran and Pakistan, the US military industrial complex still has strong options for dealing with any Chinese-backed regime in Afghanistan. Not the least of these is that of stepping back from one of the most volatile nuclear arms race scenarios in history – right on China’s doorstep.

Failing a (very possible) local nuclear conflagration between Islamic megacult sects and warlords In Iran and Pakistan, or between Pakistan and India, the wrong kind of geopolitical and geostrategic-military threat in the region might nevertheless provide in-principle justification for a very different, and very serious, kind of kinetic war being waged by the US.

However, it is perhaps unlikely The Taliban, having overrun Afghanistan so easily, will be amenable to the kind of influence that China will be forced to exert in any direct interaction or partnership with them.

China and The Taliban

If China does get directly involved with them, they cannot afford not to actively - diplomatically and economically - curb the vicious behaviour of the Taliban. Else they will become a true human rights pariah. Regardless of whether they curb the Taliban appropriately, the US will almost certainly follow a well-rehearsed modus operandi and geopolitical script, and use China’s involvement as another excuse to foment war against the world’s most powerful truly secular, atheist state.

Moreover, if China did succeed in partnering directly with The Taliban, with direct Chinese financial aid the Taliban may become a serious military threat to the US. This might happen rapidly if The Taliban admits Chinese military appliances and infrastructure into Afghanistan. This would likely result in the US claiming justification for a heavy-handed approach.

The US has a war machine in waiting. They may well take the opportunity to use mass drone strikes, drone swarms, and hypersonic weapons against Afghanistan without inserting any troops. Why? The Taliban won’t be just tribesman with Kalashnikovs anymore. They will constitute an actionable, serious, immanent threat to the US and its allies.

A scenario where China partners directly with the Taliban might well also be rejected, or seriously limited, by the Taliban itself, as too much resembling previous occupations by foreign superpowers. Furthermore - for all their economic diplomacy, the Communist Party of China are regarded as infidel by the Islamic megacult.

Therefore, although a direct partnership with the Taliban is possible and affords China more direct influence, the far more likely scenario is significant indirect backing by China via Iran or Pakistan, with the more likely partner being better equipped, and more ideologically aligned, Iran:

The China-Iran relationship is rooted in limited pragmatic cooperation but has evolved in recent years into a partnership more pointedly opposed to the U.S.-led international order … Iran views China as a critical economic lifeline and diplomatic supporter against pressure from the United States. A 25-year cooperation agreement signed in March 2021 is the latest indication of the two sides’ willingness to coordinate more closely. One factor limiting China’s partnership with Iran is the Chinese government’s apprehension over the prospect of armed conflict between Iran and the United States. Any conflict with Iran could destabilize the energy markets China relies on to fuel its growth … China has sustained its status as Iran’s top economic partner despite significantly reducing economic engagement due to its partial compliance with U.S. sanctions. Nevertheless, various circumvention methods have allowed China to continue purchasing Iranian oil in violation of these sanctions… China provides an economic lifeline to the Iranian regime while deepening its leverage over the country… China and Iran maintain modest defense cooperation and share intelligence... China has supported Iran’s cruise and ballistic missile programs for decades, including through technology likely utilized in at least one of the missile systems…[in Iraq] (USCC. )

US Geostrategy, Money, and Megacult Ideology

Recently there have been comparisons made between the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its 1975 withdrawal from Saigon. However, the US did achieve many of their ends in Vietnam, and in their earlier war against communism in Korea. In the Korean conflict, the border between North and South Korea returned to pre-war status, after two initial resoundingly successful invasions of the south – first by North Korean troops, then by Chinese troops. Communist adventurism was stopped.

The US technically lost militarily in its role in the 1953-1975 conflict with communist Vietnam. Yet, they had economic and geopolitical objectives in which they were far more successful. The cold war with the USSR was in progress, and the total cost of the arms race and the cold war to the Soviets and Chinese was likely the more important overarching strategy. War is good for heating up a capitalist economy, but only a burden on a socialist and communist society.

The US always intended to out-spend the Soviets, and out-spend them they did. Economics and business have been viewed as a substitute for warfare in many of the West’s economic theories since at least the 1970s, and much earlier economics-based strategies were deployed against China in the Opium Wars.

Just as significant as the economic outcomes in Afghanistan are religionist and para-religionist ideological imperatives. US neocon megacultists don't care about an opposing Muslim megacult in Afghanistan that they despise.

Overall, the US achieved their objective of keeping opposing, fanatical megacult Afghanistan in the third world, harmless, and neutralised. A few thousand troops were likely worth it to them, and their massive military expenditure is likely no more than a potentially lucrative investment to the military industrial complex. At minimum, the US and its military-industrial complex would likely be happy for China to bear the cost of managing the Taliban in Afghanistan now. Moreover, China is now faced with a local nuclear risk matrix in which the US is no longer a mitigating factor.

Pakistan Vs Iran and The Taliban

Nuclear risk aside, the US would benefit from a China-backed Pakistan opposing Iran. Moreover, if Iran and The Taliban do not reach an accord, the Taliban may still also shut Pakistan out of Afghanistan with a hard border, thus providing an additional impediment against expansion of Iranian power in the region.

Economic and military aid to The Taliban from China via Pakistan would still be unlikely to come without serious demands for curbs on Taliban human rights abuses, although these could be diminished. The Taliban has shown scant regard for such demands in the past. With multiple options available to the Taliban for strategic partnerships, including self-isolationism, it is unlikely China will be able to indirectly curb Taliban bloodlust and barbarism completely, if at all. There is too much of an ideological and social-psychological disconnect between the communist, atheist superpower and the deeply group-delusional, misatheist, infidelophobic Islamic megacult.

In any case, there are signs the Taliban would not favour Pakistan over Iran. Pakistan and the Taliban have troubled ties:

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan has told every public and private forum that Pakistan wants peace in Afghanistan, has no favorites in the battle and is deeply opposed to a military takeover by the Taliban. The country’s powerful army chief has twice walked out of meetings with the Taliban, frustrated at their intransigence and infuriated by what he sees as the Taliban’s determination to return to full power in Afghanistan, according to senior security officials familiar with the meetings. (https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/some-afghans-blame-neighboring-pakistan-for-taliban-gains/ )

Iran and the Taliban may well become dangerous allies. Pakistan does not currently have military and scientific capabilities to threaten the US, but Iran is a known risk. The Taliban might invite Iran into Afghanistan with military infrastructure, which would also make Afghanistan a very strategically and tactically different, and more urgent, kind of hot war objective for the US:

Although Iran and the Taliban remained in a sectarian rivalry during the 1990s, the post-9/11 scenario in the region, especially a shared animosity toward the U.S. along with many other internal and external developments indicate that it would be disadvantageous for the insurgent group to cut their ties with the Islamic republic. The misunderstandings leading to mistrust which prompted sectarian hatred between Iran and the Taliban have been evaporating, paving the way for a stable long-term alignment glued by and centered on political Islam. During their reign in the 1990s, the Taliban received patronage from Iran’s rival, Saudi Arabia. However, it was difficult for the Kingdom to take the side of its client (the Taliban) at the expense of its patron (the U.S.) in the post-9/11 world. Saudi Arabia’s harsh measures against Qatar, where the Taliban have their political office, and Doha’s improved ties with Tehran, helped clear the clouds of mistrust and misunderstanding between Iran and the Taliban. With Iran showing strong tendencies of an Islamic theocratic state, the Afghan insurgent group would find it unfavorable to degrade its relations with Tehran, especially when the group has been struggling to establish a government based on Islamic values in Afghanistan. The remodeling of their relations is evident in the Taliban’s continued consultations with Iranian authorities. The group’s leadership has undertaken a number of visits to Tehran since the commencement of its peace negotiations with the United States. Their most recent trips in the aftermath of temporary collapse in the U.S.-Taliban talks not only reflect Tehran’s significance for the Afghan insurgency but also show the growing trust between the two parties.( https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/why-the-taliban-wont-cut-ties-with-iran/ )

Both Iran and Pakistan are economically dependent upon China. However, China is perhaps currently more urgently geostrategically aligned with Pakistan, who are directly opposed to India, which is a member nation of The Quad nations alliance whose mission is to implement the US' ‘surround and contain’ initiative against China, and to oppose China’s prevention of the secession of Taiwan. It is a good bet that the current value of backing an opponent of India is comparable to that of backing the Ayatollah’s regime as a thorn in the geostrategic side of the US. However, this may depend upon how highly China regards India’s military capability on the border with Tibet.

The more pressing consideration is likely to be Pakistan's nuclear stockpile.

Even though both are largely economically vassal to China, Pakistan may thus still provide a convenient buffer against Iranian power expansion in Afghanistan. Yet it is unclear whether China could diffuse tensions between the two long-term, nuclear-capable ideological and political rivals, even with economic sanctions. This is something the US is likely to have banked upon in its withdrawal. Pakistan has commenced the fencing of the Pakistan-Iran border and funds the Sunni dominated anti-Iran terrorist group Jaish-ul-Adl (IICT). It has spent loan money from China, intended for use on Belt and Road initiatives, on its fight with both Iran and Afghanistan.

So, the US may reap the convenient outcome that China-supported Pakistan will help contain China-backed Iran, whether or not the Taliban blocks Pakistan from entering Afghanistan, which latter outcome has become increasingly likely:

Pakistan hasn’t even been able to convince the Taliban to reopen the border crossing at Spin Boldak in southeastern Afghanistan, which the insurgent force captured last month, … In their sweep through Afghanistan, which began with the late April start of the final withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, the Taliban have gained control of strategic and lucrative border crossings, including the Spin Boldak crossing with Pakistan… the Taliban closed the crossing in southeast Afghanistan after Islamabad demanded that Afghans crossing to the Pakistani side have a passport and a Pakistani visa, something that had not previously been required. The Taliban accused Pakistan of imposing the new rules to please Kabul and President Ashraf Ghani. (AP News)

Pakistan’s Nuclear Stockpile

The geostrategic elephant in the room that most likely underpins much of the US withdrawal, already mentioned above, is that China is now de-facto presiding over the stabilisation of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Or else they may have to deal with the consequences of not doing so. How reliable their influence can be is difficult to adduce, but ideological differences alone are cause for concern.

Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to former Secretary of State Colin Powell and retired US Army Colonel, laid bare some of the salient geostrategic fundamentals relating to the US' approach to Pakistan's nuclear stockpile while speaking at the Ron Paul Institute in August 2018 on the threefold purposes of the US presence in Afghanistan:

The second reason we’re there [in Afghanistan] is because we’re cheek and jowl with the potentially most unstable nuclear stockpile on…earth in Pakistan…the third reason we were there [in Afghanistan] is because there are 20 million Uyghurs [in Xinjiang]. The CIA would want to destabilize China and that would be the best way to do it to foment unrest and to join with those Uyghurs in pushing the Han Chinese in Beijing from internal places rather than external. (Chinese embassy in Australia)

Geopolitically speaking, it is fair to say that the strategy of fomenting terrorism and unrest in Xinjiang worked. Strategically speaking - if there is a nuclear conflict between Pakistan and any of its neighbours, then China stands to lose far more, and risk far more, in terms of fallout. Literally. India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are all on China’s geographic doorstep. The US mainland is remote. It is unlikely that US strategists did not factor this into their considerations.

Put simply: there is an elevated risk that nations in the region presided over by megacult delusionals will wage nuclear war upon each other for their imaginary omnipotent friend right in China’s backyard. Not to mention that they may aim their nuclear arsenal at infidel China in the process. China may contain a huge Muslim population, but Islamic megacultists are notoriously amenable to martyrdom.

The US Military Industrial Complex Prevails

So overall, there are several possible geostrategic outcomes that might manifest in Afghanistan pending the Taliban’s next actions and China’s diplomatic manoeuvres. However, although there are opportunities for China if they get their strategy right, there are volatile unknowns. Managing interfaces with, and between, Iran, Pakistan, and The Taliban will present plenty of potential costs and headaches.

It is just as likely, given the delusional, fundamentalist, megacult proclivities of the mentally unstable Taliban leadership, that Afghanistan will become a backwards, isolationist, Caliphate and a geostrategic and geopolitical no man’s land and no-fly zone where infidel China and its Middle East allies are all excluded.

A greater overriding concern, however, is the possibility of localised nuclear conflict due to the insane theistic imperatives of all of the regions’ megacult delusionals. Not to mention the associated risk presented by the irrational infidelophobia of their ridiculous, arcane, intrinsically bigoted doctrines.

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