Sino-Russian 'Axis' Program. Ukrainian and Russian local intelligence and propaganda sources 280222H

See bottom of post for instructions and interpretational guidelines.

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Commencement of Data:

280222H. Prima Facie verifiable (kinetics/location). Common Propaganda/Aggregator Channel.

Initial Assessment: Spontaneous, real, recent smartphone capture. Chernihiv, Oblast, Northern Ukraine. Nature of kinetic event: bombardment. Type of bombardment unclear.

War Online (Новости) Украина, ДНР, ЛНР, Киев, Война, [28/02/2022 9:45 PM]

[ Video ]

В Чернигове уничтожен склад ВСУ

Intermediate source: WarOnline ( https://t.me/+mzJrI43MX0c0MGMy )

War Online (News) Ukraine, DNR, LNR, Kyiv, War, [28/02/2022 9:45 PM]

[Video]

APU warehouse destroyed in Chernihiv

Source (intermediate) WarOnline ( https://t.me/+mzJrI43MX0c0MGMy )

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GUIDE

Many sources are not verified, but most are reliable local witnesses using smartphones. Other sources include Russian troop cameras used by Russian information and disinformation feeds. These are often 'spun' but can still be real current footage or other source material.

Difficulty of fakes easiness scale (1 = easiest):

1. 'Official' government documents - digital

2. Still photographs

3. Video with limited background and movement (interviews)

4. 'Official' government documents - hard copy but photographed

5. Video with high levels of situational background data (outdoors, high movement/dynamics, multiple noise sources)

To avoid the illusion of consensus and disinformation multiple supporting heterogeneous sources must be secured. Many channel data that agree very closely, should lead one to conclude - against intuition - that the upstream source is common and may be fake (limited heterogeneity). Actual witness sources tend to be erratic and have different errors - too perfect is often bad (not always). At least two very different source types (eyewitness and live footage, plus dispatch) and they are all 'misaligned' are more reliable. For video capture footage of interviews and interrogations analysis involves interpretation of haptic cues, nonverbal cues, and paralinguistic cues. This can work for foreign language speakers due to cross-cultural psychological consistencies.

Examples of excellent compound source:

The same scene shot with multiple different smartphone cameras from various angles by different people on the ground.

Lots of military kinetics and remarkable battle footage. Such will be hard to fake, and if already circulating from earlier conflicts will be recognisable from previous media broadcasts.

Assessing Documents

Initial assessment (partial list):

- Wear and tear

- Language

- Handwriting

- Ink chronology

- Redundant if not real

- Watermarks

- Likely objective

- Possible objectives/effects

- Dates

- Annotations (handwriting, ink chronology, colours, implements)

- Time codes

- Artefacts (especially incidental and based on damage and wear and tear)

Assessing Video

Initial assessment (partial list, unsorted):

- Resolution and quality

- Camera model watermarks

- Time codes

- Time code formats

- Clothing

- Haptic cues and facial cues

- Paralinguistic cues

- Vehicle manufacture and markings

- Lighting/time of day

- Chronology

- Source

- Source modus operandi

- Geography and terrain

- Architecture

- Foliage (vegetation)

- Capture quality (camerawork)

- Production features

- Artefacts (especially incidental and based on damage and malfunction. e.g. cracked/scratched smart phone camera lense)