New parliamentary Petition: EN2804 Foreign Interference/Influence and Australian Think Tanks
- Informationist Magazine
- Jun 19, 2021
- 2 min read
Terms:
There are research institutes in Australia that claim to be geopolitics, policy, defence, cybersecurity, and intelligence think tanks. One of these in particular is funded significantly by foreign arms and military technology manufacturers.
The think tank in question not only produces an enormous amount of output that is clearly marketing (including viral, nudge, and indirect marketing) for foreign military and armaments businesses, but is significantly funded by Australia's taxpayers through defence budgets.
That think tank or research/policy institute has close financial and business ties with foreign manufacturers of military technology that are almost certainly necessarily affiliated with various Western, foreign security and intelligence agencies in the US, UK, France, other parts of Europe and Scandinavia.
Australian taxpayers should not be financing the marketing of foreign weapons and weapons technology to Australia.
Australian think tanks and policy shops should not be engaged in marketing and political activism that is influenced by foreign intelligence agenices connected with foreign military tech makers.
We therefore ask the House to conduct reviews into the actions and funding of Australian think tanks that use taxpayer funds to market foreign military technology in, and to, Australia, and have strong ties to US and European military arms manufacturers. Furthermore, that such policy and research shops and research institutes that have these financial and business relationships should be investigated to ensure that foreign
References:
Subdivision C – Foreign interference involving foreign intelligence agencies
Section 92.7 – Knowingly supporting foreign intelligence agency
1055. Section 92.7 makes it an offence to provide support or resources to an organisation or a person acting on behalf on an organisation where the person knows that the organisation is a foreign intelligence organisation. This offence will be punishable by a maximum of 15 years imprisonment.
1056. An example of this offence is as follows. Person A is an Australian citizen with an ongoing relationship with Person B, whom Person A knows is a foreign intelligence service officer. In response to specific requests from Person B, Person A makes a series of administrative arrangements that will facilitate Person B’s movements and activities within Australia. Person A believes that Person B is travelling to Australia for operational purposes but is unaware of the specific activity Person B is conducting.
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Section 92.8 – Recklessly supporting foreign intelligence agency
1070. Section 92.8 makes it an offence to provide support or resources to an organisation or a person acting on behalf on an organisation where the person knows that the organisation is a foreign intelligence organisation. This offence will be punishable by a maximum of 10 years imprisonment.
… Section 92.9 – Knowingly funding or being funded by foreign intelligence agency
1083. Section 92.9 will make it an offence for a person to fund or be funded by a foreign intelligence agency. The offence will apply where a person receives or obtains funds from, make funds available to, or collects funds for or on behalf of, a foreign intelligence agency. The offence will only apply where the person knows that the organisation is a foreign intelligence agency.
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