My new substack article is a doozy. There's spotted autobiographical adventure. There's blockbuster philosophy of information and informational metaphysics. There's swashbuckling metaphilosophical disquisition about how to do naturalistic metaphysics. It's got unfettered attributions of assholiness to AAP philosophers (Don't worry! They deserve it a lot!) It's got jokes about defective, toxic-networked peer-reviewers up the yin-yang!
(Fuck Paul E Griffiths, Peter Evans, Huw Price, and all of the vicious sociopathic DUFFHOLES at The University o Sydney, include that nasty fuckwit related to my estranged bumhole of a brother in law!)
Readers should at least find it entertaining (and probably alarming!) It's a no-holds-barred excoriation of a couple of really badly executed and badly motivated reviews of this paper by perpetrators (sorry - reviewers) who are also likely to have been badly toxic-networked:
Abstract. The so-called hard problem of consciousness is that there are
qualitative properties of phenomenal experiences called qualia which cannot in-principle
be explained or analysed physically or in physical terms. One of the most interesting, if
unpopular, responses to the hard problem is to circumvent it altogether with
thoroughgoing eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness. A related, more subtle,
and less comprehensively eliminative approach - according to which conscious
experience is real but qualia are not - is illusionism. I’ll defend strong illusionism by of
analysing it in terms of an informational or information-theoretic model and theory of
mental content. I will propose a scientific, or naturalistic, metaphysical approach based
upon The Mathematical Theory of Communication (TMTC). This informational
approach grounds the analysis and modelling in a simple, explanatorily robust, coherent,
adequately rigorous, and systematic way at an appropriate moderate level of abstraction
according to a naturalistic or scientific metaphysics.
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